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Abstract 
Recent theories aim at explaining asymmetric cost pass-through by different consumer 
search efforts depending on whether prices increase or decrease. This paper 
investigates the relation between price adjustments and consumer search intensity for 
the German electricity retail market utilizing a unique panel dataset comprising retail 
electricity prices and consumer search queries on price-comparison websites. The main 
findings are 1) consumers search less when prices fall than when they rise, 2) costs are 
passed-through asymmetrically and 3) controlling for search intensity particularly 
eliminates the asymmetry. This suggests that ‘Rockets and Feathers’ patterns may be 
explained by an omitted variable bias. 
Keywords: Information, Cost Pass-through, Consumer Search, Rockets and Feathers 
JEL Codes: D83, L11  
† ZEW Centre for Economic Research Mannheim. Email: heim@zew.de. I gratefully acknowledge ene’t  
(enet.eu) for providing extensive data on search queries as well as prices and cost information. I thank 
Acxiom (acxiom.de) for providing detailed data on structural household characteristics. The paper 
benefitted from comments by Georg Götz, Klaus Gugler, Michael Hellwig, Ulrich Laitenberger, Matthew 
Lewis, Bettina Peters, Dennis Rickert, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Joel Stiebale and Michael Waterson as 
well as presentations and discussions at the Jornadas de Economia Industrial 2016 and the EARIE 2016 
conferences. Financial support by the State Government of Baden-Württemberg, Germany, through the 
research program ’Strengthening Efficiency and Competitiveness in the European Knowledge Economies’ 
(SEEK) is gratefully acknowledged. 
                                                 
1 Introduction 
Prices rise more strongly (or quickly) when costs increase than they fall when costs 
decrease. This stylized fact is frequently referred to as ‘rockets and feathers’ pricing 
and arguably gasoline retail markets present the most prominent example for such 
asymmetric cost pass-through patterns (Bacon, 1991; Borenstein et al., 1997). The 
non-competitive market structure in these (local) markets suggests that collusion may 
be a plausible explanation for the ‘rockets and feathers’ phenomenon. On these 
grounds, Borenstein et al. (1997) argue that ‘prices  are  sticky  downward  because  
when input  prices  fall  the  old  output  price  offers  a  natural  focal  point  for  
oligopolistic  sellers’.1  
However, in a famous article Peltzman (2000) analysed cost pass-through in 242 
markets and documented asymmetry in two out of three cases. Counterintuitively to 
the collusion argument, he observes asymmetric cost pass-through to the same extent 
also in atomistic markets. Thus, collusion may not always be a convincing explanation 
for ‘rockets and feathers’ patterns. This finding led Peltzman to draw a very strong 
conclusion by stating that the observed asymmetry points to a gap in an essential part 
of economic theory. 
Seeking for alternative channels for asymmetric cost transmission other than collusion 
in order to fill this gap some more recent theoretical approaches aimed at relating price 
adjustments to consumers’ search efforts (Cabral and Fishman, 2008; Yang and Ye, 
2008; Tappata, 2009, Lewis, 2011; Cabral and Gilbukh, 2015). Though these models 
differ in their setup they all share similar predictions: either consumers search more 
when prices are high and less when prices are low (Yang and Ye, 2008, Tappata, 2009) 
1 An excellent literature survey on asymmetric cost pass-through is from Meyer and von Cramon-
Taubadel (2004). 
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or consumers search more when prices rise and less when prices fall (Cabral and 
Fishman, 2008; Lewis, 2011; Cabral and Gilbukh, 2015). 
The underlying intuition is fairly simple: consumer search affects the competitive 
environment faced by a firm. If prices for a good or service are high (or increase) 
consumers are more likely to engage in search for alternative suppliers than if prices 
are low (or decrease). Thus, a consumer’s current supplier finds herself in a more 
competitive environment when prices are high (or rise) and consumers search more 
compared to a situation where prices are low (or fall) and consumers search less and 
are less aware of cheaper alternative suppliers. Putting it differently, not the absolute 
number of competitors is relevant in determining the level of competition but the 
number of competitors with prices known to the consumer. Hence, search intensity is 
nothing else than a measure of competitive pressure. Or as Tappata (2009) puts it: 
‘Consumers’ search decisions affect the elasticity of the expected demand faced by 
firms and therefore their cost pass-through.’(Tappata, 2009).  
These theories suggest that search intensity may provide an explanation for 
asymmetric cost pass-through. If this prediction proofs to be right than Peltzman’s 
claimed gap in economic theory would be nothing else than a violation of the complete 
information assumption: for the law of one price – as known from the standard 
homogeneous goods Bertrand model – to be valid, consumers must be aware of all 
offered prices for the product (Stigler, 1961). Therefore, an empirically estimated 
asymmetric cost pass-through rate may point towards an omitted variable bias due to 
the omission of consumer information rather than a gap in economic theory. 
In this context I empirically investigate the potential link between cost changes, price 
adjustments and consumer search intensity utilizing a rich and unique panel data set 
on prices, costs and consumer search intensity in the German retail electricity market. 
The market provides excellent properties for the analysis. First, electricity is a classic 
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example for a homogeneous good2. Second, there are many local markets with different 
prices and costs. More precisely, there are 777 local incumbents in Germany, each 
serving a separate supply area. But costs and thus prices differ even within the same 
supply area as will be explained later in the data section. This provides substantial 
regional variation in cost and price developments. Third, since the market was 
liberalized in 1999 (when the EU Directive 96/92/EC came into force) customers can 
freely choose their electricity supplier. For instance, in 2014 a household could choose 
between 73 and 198 providers for retail electricity (155 on average), depending on its 
location. This makes collusion unlikely.  
Fourth, there substantial search costs apparently exist in the market: even though a 
standard two-person household with 3,500 kWh yearly electricity consumption would 
have saved 196 Euro by switching from the former incumbents’ standard tariff to the 
cheapest local supplier, 78% of all German households were still supplied by the former 
incumbent in 2014.3 This price dispersion accounts for approximately 20%.4 The 
violation of the ‘law of one price’ may be explained by the existence of search costs as 
theory (e.g. Stigler, 1961, Varian, 1980, Stahl, 1989, Burdett and Judd, 1993, Janssen 
and Moraga-González, 2004, Chandra and Tappata, 2011) and empirical studies (e.g. 
Sorensen, 2000, Baye et al., 2004, Chandra and Tappata, 2011, Giuletti et al., 2014, 
Hortacsu et al., 2015, Pennersdorfer et al., 2015, Gugler et al., 2016) suggest. In 
general, there are two further candidate explanations for the observed price dispersion 
2 There may be some form of product differentiation, such as certification of a tariff with a “green” label 
etc. In my sample, less than 4% of all search queries relate to tariffs with eco-labels. Therefore, in the 
present application I exclude search queries that exclusively consider eco-label tariffs in order to rule out 
pricing effects from such a form of product differentiation. However, the results remain fully robust 
when these searches are also included. 
3 Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency) and Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office (2014) 
Monitoringreport. 
4 For comparison: the costs for 3,500 kW electricity estimated from whole sale electricity prices only 
account for an average 15% of the retail electricity price charged by the incumbents.  
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which may also contribute to the observed consumer inertia, namely switching costs 
and brand effects. In the present case, switching costs are not likely to be relevant as 
a) the switching process is an automated process and conducted by the chosen new 
electricity retailer and b) the cancellation period for the incumbents’ base tariffs is 
only two weeks by law. Brand effects are also not likely to play a substantial role in 
the market (see Giuletti et al, 2012, or Hortacsu et al, 2015). There is no reason to 
assume that the incumbent supplier provides a higher security of supply as the 
incumbent has the legal obligation to guarantee a continuous provision of electricity to 
the consumers.5 Therefore, if an entrant goes bankrupt the bankrupt firm’s customers 
experience a seamless transition to the local incumbent’s standard tariff without an 
interruption of electricity supply and without penalizing these consumers.6 
Thus, above market characteristics suggest that if costs are passed-through 
asymmetrically than collusion may not be a very reasonable explanation but search 
costs may be.7 Finally, the market provides an excellent robustness check for the 
analysis. As initially all consumers are automatically assigned to the (former) 
incumbent the shares of informed and uninformed consumers are heterogeneous 
between incumbents and entrants. This is important: if a consumer never searches the 
incumbent is a monopolist for this consumer. However, for each searching consumer 
the incumbents market changes to perfect competition exactly in the moment the 
5 In this regard, Hortacsu et al. (2015) estimate that there is a perceived brand effect consumers attach 
to the incumbent. However, the effect diminishes rapidly in the first years of retail choice and is already 
very small at the end of their observation in 2006. Therefore, in my observation period (2011 to 2014) 
the majority of the consumers should be aware of the statutory safety net provided by the incumbents. 
6 Indeed, two of the bigger alternative providers went bankrupt in 2011 (Teldafax) and 2013 
(Flexstrom), respectively.  
7 Furthermore, a household’s demand for electricity can be described as perfectly inelastic in the short-
term which excludes convexity of the demand curve as a candidate explanation for potential asymmetric 
pass-through (Ritz, 2015). 
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consumer enters the online price comparison site. By contrast, each consumer that 
receives electricity from one of the entrants had to actively engage in searching before 
leaving the incumbent and signing with the entrant. Thus, while the incumbent’s 
customers are generally uninformed (otherwise they would generally switch to one of 
the much cheaper entrants) those of the entrants are much more informed (see Gugler 
et al. 2016). As a consequence, if consumers’ search intensity actually affects pass-
through rates then this should only hold for the incumbents while entrants should be 
unaffected by consumer search intensity or at least not affected to the same extent as 
the incumbent. 
To my knowledge this is the first empirical paper that directly relates cost pass-
through to consumer search patterns. It is also the first paper that utilizes a direct 
measure of consumer search intensity in a panel data context. 
 
2 Empirical Strategy 
The analysis is conducted in three steps. First, I investigate whether consumers’ search 
efforts are a function of prices and price movements, respectively. i.e. do consumers 
actually search more when prices are high (increase) than when they are low 
(decrease)? Subsequently, I analyse whether there is evidence for an asymmetric cost 
pass-through in the electricity retail market using conventional methods to evaluate 
potential cost pass-through asymmetries. Eventually, I check whether consumer search 
intensity has an impact on price adjustments. Summarized my findings are 1) 
consumers search more when prices are high or increase than when prices are low or 
decrease, 2) costs are passed-through asymmetrically in a ‘rocket and feathers’ manner 
in models which do not consider the potential impact of consumer search intensity on 
price adjustments and 3) considering consumer search intensity particularly eliminates 
the asymmetry in the pass-through rates.  
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The examination of the first step in this paper is inspired by Lewis and Marvel (2011) 
who analyse gasoline prices in the US and find that on average the level of consumer 
search is higher when prices increase than when they decrease. However, there are also 
some differences. First, Lewis and Marvel only regress the level of search intensity 
rather than changes in search intensity on gasoline price adjustments. Thus, they do 
not directly measure the adjustments of search intensity to price changes. Also, I 
consider the likely endogeneity between consumer search and pricing strategies using 
regional variation in exogenous cost components (such as grid charges) to instrument 
for prices while Lewis and Marvel (2011) instrument for national average gasoline price 
changes through wholesale price changes which is potentially related to 
demand/quantity. Next, my data enable me to take advantage of spatial variation 
while Lewis and Marvel (2011) use a time series with national aggregated prices and 
thus do not consider any spatial differences. Finally, the Lewis and Marvel (2011) data 
on gasoline prices rely on consumer reporting and they do not actually observe prices 
for all stations. This might induce a bias in terms of an oversampling of low prices as 
the authors acknowledge as these are the prices that the reporting consumers actually 
pay. Despite these differences, my findings in the first step provide additional evidence 
of similar behaviour to what Lewis and Marvel (2011) are seeing, i.e. search intensity is 
high (increases) when prices are high (increase) and low (decreases) when prices are 
low (decrease).8 
In the second step I apply a common approach to examine asymmetric cost-pass-
through (e.g. Borenstein et al., 1997) by splitting cost changes into cost increases and 
decreases and regressing price changes on the two split cost variables. 
Most important is the third step where I include consumer search intensity into the 
model to test whether this contributes to the explanation of price adjustments and 
8 Hortacsu et al. (2015) 
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pass-through symmetry. Again, endogeneity of search is considered through 
instrumental variables. 
I will first describe the data and identification strategy in section 2, followed by the 
empirical models and the results in section 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3 Data and Variables 
I utilize a unique and detailed panel data set on consumer search activities, retail 
electricity prices and cost components from ene’t. Acxiom provides data on structural 
household characteristics. The Acxiom data are on yearly level while the ene’t data are 
monthly (costs and prices) and minutely timestamps (search queries). I aggregate the 
ene’t data also on yearly level as a typical electricity contract lasts twelve month and 
even if the contract can be terminated on a monthly basis most retailers offer a 
substantial switching bonus which they only pay out after twelve months. Therefore, I 
assume that an average household does not search more than once a year. The data 
span the years 2011 to 2014. As prices, costs and search intensity varies regionally the 
spatial data resolution is on zip code level (8,224 zip codes).  
 
Measure of consumer search intensity 
I construct a measure for consumer search intensity from the ene’t data which contains 
detailed information from click data spanning the period from March 2011 to 
December 2014. The data base covers all search queries conducted on several price 
comparison platforms including Toptarif.de (top tariff), Stromtipp.de (power tip), 
Energieverbraucherportal.de (energy consumption portal) and mut-zum-wechseln.de 
(courage-to-change).  For each query I observe the timestamp of the query, the zip 
code for which the offered electricity tariffs were requested, the (expected) yearly 
consumption entered into the search mask, consumer type (household or industrial 
customer), the search criteria, e.g. indicating whether the consumer is only interested 
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in electricity tariffs with an eco-label as well as a search session ID indicating the order 
of the queries of each searching consumer. Exemplary, a screenshot of the search mask 
from Toptarif.de is available in the Appendix (Figure 2). In sum I have information on 
35,855,071 search queries and 17,302,530 search sessions from which 16,778,214 are 
conducted by households and the remaining 524,316 by industrial customers. I will 
focus on households and therefore exclude the search queries from industrial 
consumers. 
From the data I construct a measure for consumer information as follows: Because 
many searchers conduct several search queries within a search session (e.g. comparing 
prices for different levels of consumptions and different tariffs) I only consider the 
number of search sessions and refer to a consumer conducting a search session as being 
fully informed regardless of the depth of her search activity. I then aggregate the 
search sessions within a zip code area on yearly basis and subsequently divide this 
value by the number of households within the same zip code area in the corresponding 
year. Because I observe some extreme outliers in some zip code areas apparently 
resulting from price comparing bots or the curse of data crawling researchers I drop 
the 2% of the observations with the highest values from the data. The measure for 
consumer search intensity can be written as  
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
with 𝜇𝜇 describing search intensity, 𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 the number of search sessions, 𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  the number 
of households and subscripts 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 represent zip codes and years. Searches on online 
price comparison sites should work as an excellent proxy for the general consumer 
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search intensity as the vast majority of consumers uses online price comparison site to 
switch their electricity provider.9  
 
Price 
Retail electricity prices vary significantly regionally. There are 777 incumbents in 
Germany serving their local supply areas (mostly municipal utilities, so called 
Stadtwerke), however, their prices also vary within the same supply area due to finer 
cost variation. I therefore go down to zip code levels. In 2014 the electricity bill for a 2 
person household with 3,500 kWh yearly electricity consumption in the incumbent’s 
base tariff was on average 1004 euro, varying from 761 and 1204 Euro, depending on 
the zip code of the household. The cheapest entrant charged on average 808 Euro per 
year. Prices in each zip code are observed on a due date each month and subsequently 
transformed into year averages. 
In the main application I will focus on a standard two-person household with on 
average 3,500 kWh yearly consumption. However, all results presented in the paper are 
fully robust to alternative household sizes such as a one-person household with 2,000 
kWh consumption or a four-person household with an average consumption of 5,000 
kWh per year. 
 
Costs 
Costs differ substantially over zip codes due to several regionally varying cost 
components, particularly the grid charges and the concession fee. Grid charges are paid 
by the electricity provider to the respective system operator and thus vary over the 
873 German distribution grids (basically the former incumbents’ supply areas, 
9 According to a survey 80%  of the switchers searched online for alternative providers (A.T. Kearney,      
2012) 
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however, some former incumbents had to sell their grids in due course of unbundling 
legislations). The concession fee has to be paid by the system operator to the 
municipality for the right to install and operate electric cables on public roads and 
therefore varies on municipality level (12,308 municipalities). In 2014 costs for 3,500 
kWh electricity varied on average around 33 Euro (maximum 240 Euro) over the 8,224 
zip codes. These costs also vary substantially over time. From 2013 to 2014 the change 
in these variable costs varied between a 90 Euro decrease and a 85 Euro increase over 
all zip codes, 17 Euro on average. 
In addition there are cost components without regional but also with time variation. 
These are in particular the wholesale electricity price and the EEG cost apportionment 
– a fee consumers have to pay per MW in order to subsidize renewable energies 
according to the renewable energy act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG). For the 
wholesale price I use the yearly average of the Phelix Base one year ahead futures 
which are available from the EEX (European Energy Exchange).10 The costs for 3,500 
kWh at the wholesale markets where approximately 156 Euro in our observation 
period and thus accounted for less than 16% of the incumbents’ average prices. I also 
consider value added taxes, electricity taxes, measuring fees and CHP surcharges. 
From these cost data I compute a) the regionally varying costs and b) the total costs 
per zip code and year for incumbents and entrants.11  
Figure 3 to Figure 5 in the Appendix provides an overview on the spatial distribution 
of prices, costs and search intensity. Figure 6 and Figure 7 in the Appendix illustrate 
the distribution of cost changes for each year. 
10 However, all results reported in the paper are robust to sensible alternative definitions of the 
wholesale prices such as yearly averages of the Phelix day-ahead spot prices and a also a mixture of 
both (Phelix Base Spot + Phelix Base future 1 year)/2. 
11 Total costs for incumbents and entrants differ due to differences in value added taxes from different 
prices. 
10 
 
                                                 
Structural household characteristics 
Several household characteristics may also have an impact on a household’s likelihood 
to engage in searching. Data on household characteristics (zip code level) are gathered 
from Axciom and include the share of households with the head of the household below 
the age of 40, the shares of households that moved out (moved households) and into 
the zip code area (new households), respectively, as well as the share of households 
with low financial resources (low income). These factors potentially affect consumer 
search: younger people are more familiar with the internet and therefore have 
potentially lower search costs, people that move out of a zip code may not be very 
interested in entering into a new electricity contract in this zip code, new arrivals in a 
zip code may look for a good electricity tariff there and people with financial 
constraints may be more likely to search for a cheaper electricity tariff. The summary 
statistics are shown in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max #Obs. 
Information 
% of searching households (𝜇𝜇) 9.28 6.46 0.00 36.06 30.681 
∆𝜇𝜇 0.54 9.44 -29.67 36.37 21,128 
Price for 3,500 kW electricity consumption/year 
Price incumbent (€/a) 1003.90 78.23 761.01 1204.15 30,681 
∆ Price incumbent 51.58 47.57 -76.10 186.41 21,128 
Price entrant (€/a) 807.75 58.74 657.19 903.03 30,968 
∆ Price entrant 43.08 34.44 -85.18 153.46 21,128 
Computed yearly costs for 3,500 kW electricity 
Costs incumbent 840.80 58.17 635.41 1021.23 30,681 
∆Costs incumbent 29.40 35.55 -88.40 143.99 21,128 
Costs cntrant 809.64 56.43 658.72 989.68 30,681 
∆Costs cntrant 31.13 44.34 -87.27 160.46 21,128 
Locally varying costs 254.00 31.59 103.68 384.66 30,681 
∆ Locally varying costs 8.00 16.44 -98.22 148.53 21,128 
Controls and Instruments 
% Head of household under the age of 40 24.60 5.00 7.70 55.00 30,968 
% New households 5.60 2.10 0.70 79.00 30,968 
% Moved households 5.50 2.00 1.20 79.50 30,968 
% Low Status 19,77 23,33 0 100 30,968 
Note: Summary statistics reported for the period from 2011 to 2014. 
 
A deeper descriptive inspection of the data already suggests that costs are passed 
through asymmetrically: while costs increased in 16,670 and decreased in 4,458 cases, 
the incumbents increased prices in 16,779 but decreased them in only 532 occasions. In 
3,817 cases the incumbent did not adjust prices. By contrast, the entrants were four 
times more likely to decrease prices (2,152 cases). 
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4 Consumer Search 
In this section I explore whether consumers’ search intensity is a function of prices and 
price changes, respectively. Figure 1 illustrates the patterns of consumer search on 
online price comparison sites using click data from the above mentioned online price 
comparison sites (upper panel) as well as Google Trends for the biggest platform 
Verivox (lower panel) over time. The red lines document the yearly announcement of 
next year’s Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG) cost 
apportionment.12 Due to the increased share of renewables the EEG cost 
apportionment increased each year in our observation period. Each year the next 
year’s EEG cost apportionment is published on October 15th accompanied by 
extensive media reporting on the EEG cost apportionment and in particular its 
increase. Thus, households receive information on an increase of one component of 
their electricity bill. As households are generally much less aware of the remaining cost 
components’ developments (e.g local grid charges, spot prices etc.), they build their 
expectations on future retail price developments largely on the EEG cost 
apportionment which they expect to translate into a price increase the next period. 
This apparently incentivizes search efforts as search intensity is always highest at the 
12 The Renewable Energies Act (EEG) is a promotion tool for renewable energy technologies which 
equips producers of renewable energies with a 20-year fixed feed-in tariff and unlimited priority feed-in 
into the grid. In other words, maximum possible generation from renewables will be produced regardless 
of actual demand and the fixed feed-in tariff is paid instead of a market-based spot price. While the 
producers of renewable energy receive the fixed feed-id tariff, the system operators are responsible to sell 
all the produced renewables at the spot market. A result of this process is the EEG cost apportionment 
which is adjusted yearly. It is primarily calculated as the forecasted yearly difference between the 
expected expenditures from the fixed feed-in-tariff payments and the expected revenues from selling 
renewables at the spot market (e.g. forecasted revenues from renewables in 2013 were 3.1 billion Euro 
and forecasted expenditures were 22.9 billion Euro) plus the error from the last year’s calculation. These 
costs build the basis of the EEG cost apportionment. Based on this forecasted costs a price per kWh is 
computed which has to be paid by the households as a component of the retail price – the EEG cost 
apportionment. Industry is essentially exempted from the EEG cost apportionment.  
13 
 
                                                 
time the next year’s EEG apportionment is announced. Thus, the figure below 
provides a first descriptive indication for a relation between price changes and 
consumer search efforts as it reveals that consumers already search more when they 
only expect prices to increase. 
Figure 1: Development of search queries 
 
 
Note: Upper panel: Blue line is aggregated number of search sessions on several online price 
comparison sites based on click data. Lower panel: Blue line is the search activity on the 
biggest online price comparison platform Verivox from Google Trends (base month = 
November 2012). In both figures the red line illustrates the announcement of the next year’s 
EEG cost apportionment. 
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 While the descriptive illustration shows on aggregate that expected price increases 
incentivize search efforts, I now estimate the impact of positive and negative price 
changes on consumer search intensity using panel data. The following model serves as 
the baseline model: 
 
∆𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏1(∆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜌𝜌1(∆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × (1 − 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖1 + 𝜀𝜀1,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(1) 
The dependent variable ∆𝜇𝜇 denotes the change in consumer search intensity. 𝑃𝑃 is the 
electricity price and ∆𝑃𝑃 its first difference. ∆𝑋𝑋 is a vector of covariates that potentially 
also effect search activity containing the share of households with the head of the 
household being below the age of 40, the share of moved and new households as well as 
the share of households with low financial resources. Subscripts 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 index zip codes 
and years, respectively. 𝜁𝜁 is a sign operator which is equal to one if the price has 
increased compared to the last period and zero otherwise. Thus, ∆𝑃𝑃 × 𝜁𝜁 represents the 
change in the electricity bill when it has increased and ∆𝑃𝑃 × (1 − 𝜁𝜁) when it has 
decreased.  
To consider a potential reverse causality between consumer search efforts and pricing I 
apply instrumental variable techniques and instrument for ∆𝑃𝑃 × 𝜁𝜁 and ∆𝑃𝑃 × (1 − 𝜁𝜁). 
The instruments are ∆𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 × 𝜂𝜂 and ∆𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂) where 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 reflects the regionally 
varying costs associated with 𝑃𝑃. 𝜂𝜂 is the sign operator for cost changes. Thus, the two 
endogenous variables ∆𝑃𝑃 × 𝜁𝜁 and ∆𝑃𝑃 × (1 − 𝜁𝜁) are exactly identified by the 
instruments. The two first stages are estimated as below:  
 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1(∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 × 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽1(∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) +𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃2 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜀𝜀2,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(2) 
and 
 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × (1 − 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼2(∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 × 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝛽2�∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣 × (1 −𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )�+ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃3 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖3 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖3 + 𝜀𝜀3,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
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The IV estimates of equation 1 are reported in column 5 of Table 2. Columns 1 to 4 of 
the same table contain alternative estimations of the impact of prices and price 
changes, respectively, on consumer search efforts. The dependent variable in columns 1 
to 3 is the level of consumer search intensity and in columns 4 and 5 the dependent 
variable is the yearly change in consumer search intensity, i.e. the first difference of 
consumer search intensity. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic indicates that the 
endogenous variables are identified by the instruments in all models as the critical 
values by Stock and Yogo are always exceeded.13 
In column 1 I estimate the impact of price on search intensity using a linear 
specification for price. The locally varying costs are used to instrument for price. It can 
be seen that consumers search significantly more when prices are high which is in line 
with theory. However, the impact is non-linear as suggested by the estimates in 
column 2 which also includes the squared price (instrumented by the squared variable 
costs). Both, the price level and its square are significant. The extreme point of the 
price function is at 655 Euro which is below the minimum of 761 Euro (range 761 to 
1204, see also Table 1. Thus, the impact of price on search is strictly convex 
increasing.  
The model in column 3 is identical with the baseline model from equation 1 (reported 
in column 5) with the only difference that the dependent variable is the level of search 
intensity 𝜇𝜇 instead of its first difference ∆𝜇𝜇. As the results are qualitatively similar I 
will focus on the interpretation of the estimates in column 5, which suggest that rising 
prices induce significant increases in consumer search intensity and falling prices cause 
significant reductions in search efforts. However, the impact of price decreases on the 
13 The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic is the multivariate analogue of the first stage F-test. In the 
case of a single endogenous variable the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is identical to the first stage F-
statistic. 
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adjustment of consumer search efforts is substantially higher: consumers reduce their 
search efforts much more when prices fall (coefficient 0.0111) then they increase search 
efforts when prices rise (coefficient 0.0006).14 If the electricity bill has increased by 10 
Euro from the last period search intensity increases by approximately 0.6%. However, 
when price has decreased by 10 Euro then search intensity is reduced by almost 11%.15  
Not surprisingly, this huge difference is statistically significant as a t-test rejects the 
null hypothesis of equality of 𝜏𝜏 and 𝜌𝜌 thereby indicating an asymmetric adjustment of 
consumer search efforts to positive and negative price shocks. Thus, if search intensity 
affects cost pass-through then the asymmetry in the adjustment of search efforts with 
regard to price changes would even increase the asymmetry in cost pass-through if one 
would not control for search intensity. 
  
14 Note that price increases always have a positive sign while price decreases are negative. Thus, a 
positive sign for the coefficient of a price decrease has to be interpreted in the sense, that falling prices 
cause consumers to reduce search efforts. 
15 These values should help to illustrate the asymmetric adjustment of search efforts with respect to 
positive and negative price changes. However, as I only observe search queries on some of the price 
comparison sites (not on all) they should not be interpreted as the real absolute effect of price on search 
but rather as the impact of price on the search efforts on the observed price comparison sites. 
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Table 2: IV estimates of search intensity 
 IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 IV4 IV5 
Dependent Variable is 𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇 ∆𝜇𝜇 ∆𝜇𝜇 
𝑃𝑃 0.0007*** -0.0012***    
 (0.0000) (0.0003)    
      
𝑃𝑃2   9.37e-07***    
.   (0.0000)    
      
∆𝑃𝑃 × 𝜁𝜁   0.0003***  0.0006*** 
   (0.0000)  (0.0001) 
      
∆𝑃𝑃 × (1 − 𝜁𝜁)   0.0163***  0.0111*** 
   (0.0042)  (0.0039) 
      
∆𝑃𝑃    0.0007***  
    (0.0001)  
      
share HH under age of 40 0.0845*** 0.1257*** 0.3183*** 0.4244*** 0.3383*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0280) (0.0692) (0.0693) (0.0830) 
      
share moved HH 0.1602*** 0.1577*** 0.0858 -0.0309 -0.0030 
 (0.0426) (0.0427) (0.0696) (0.0864) (0.0929) 
      
share new HH -0.1006** -0.0772* -0.0151 0.0501 0.0549 
 (0.0415) (0.0418) (0.0665) (0.0857) (0.0897) 
      
share HH with low income 0.0021 0.0008 0.0089** 0.0025 0.0097* 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0055) 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zip Code Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝜌𝜌 (p-val.)   - - 0.00 - 0.01 
U-Shape Test Extreme Values 
(Range) 
- 655  
(761-1204) 
- - - 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 1115.29 494.70 11.84 1557.43 11.84 
Critical Stock and Yogo 10% 
value for KP stat. 
16.38 7.03 7.03 16.38 7.03 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test (p-
val.) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# Obs. 30951 30951 21128 21128 21128 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered on zip codes). All models include 
zip code area and year fixed effects. Estimation is by Continuously Updating Efficient GMM 
(CUE). Instruments for the price variables are: 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 for 𝑃𝑃, squared 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 for 𝑃𝑃2, ∆𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 for ∆𝑃𝑃, 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 ×𝜂𝜂 for ∆𝑃𝑃 × 𝜁𝜁 and ∆𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 × (1−𝜂𝜂) for ∆𝑃𝑃 × (1− 𝜁𝜁). 
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5 Cost Pass-Through 
In the next step I first investigate whether the standard approach in detecting 
asymmetric pass-through rates generates asymmetric results for my data by estimating 
the below model for the incumbents. 
 
 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏2(∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜌𝜌2(∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖4 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖4 + 𝜀𝜀4,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(4) 
The notation is as above. 𝜏𝜏2 > 𝜌𝜌2  would indicate that costs are passed-through 
asymmetrically and this is what the estimates in Table 3 suggest.  
Subsequently, I additionally include consumer search intensity (𝜇𝜇) as a control variable 
and re-estimate equation 4. If search contributes to price adjustments in the assumed 
way than its coefficient should be significantly negative: more search causes a lower 
pass-through rate. If costs rise than prices increase less when search intensity is high 
and analogously if costs fall price decreases are higher in absolute terms (more 
negative) if search intensity is high.16 Technically, the equation I estimate is:  
 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏3(∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜌𝜌3�∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂)� +𝜑𝜑𝜇𝜇 + +𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖5 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖5 + 𝜀𝜀5,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(5) 
As already discussed search activity is likely endogenous to price due to simultaneous 
effects and therefore I instrument for 𝜇𝜇. The instruments for 𝜇𝜇 are the share of 
households below the age of 40, the share of moved households, the share of new 
households and – in order to capture asymmetry in the search behaviour with regard to 
price changes – also include interactions of the three instruments with cost increases 
(∆𝐶𝐶 × 𝜂𝜂) as well as with cost decreases (∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂)).17 
16 Again, note that price decreases have negative signs. Thus, the value of a price decrease is lower the 
more the price is decreased. 
17 I do not include the share of households with low income into the list of instruments. The reason is 
that low incomes may increase the risk of non-payment. Retailers potentially reflect this risk in their 
prices. Therefore, I include the share of households with low income into the model as a control variable. 
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Thus, the first stage is as below: 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏4(∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜌𝜌4�∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂)� + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃4 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖6 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖6 + 𝜀𝜀6,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(6) 
𝑍𝑍 is a set of instruments containing the nine above discussed instruments. The 
remaining notation is as before. 
The estimates of equation 4 are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. The difference 
between the estimations in column 1 and column 2 is that I also control for the 
number of competitors that are active in the respective zip code-year pair which 
provides an additional measure of competition in the local market. As entry is cheap 
and easy in the market I use the number of competitors lagged by one year to avoid 
problems with endogeneity. Turning to the cost pass-through rates the estimates 
suggest that costs are passed through asymmetrically. 𝜏𝜏2  is 0.74 and 𝜌𝜌2  is 0.41 – a cost 
increase of 1 Euro causes an average price increase of 0.74 Euro while a cost decrease 
of 1 Euro only causes a 0.41 Euro price reduction. The null hypothesis that positive 
and negative cost shocks are passed-through symmetrically is clearly rejected by a t-
test. Interestingly, the estimated pass-through rate is pretty much in line with 
Peltzman (2000) who finds that on average, the immediate response to a positive price 
shock is at approximately twice as high the response to a negative cost shock (1.8 
times higher here). 
In the next step, I estimate equation 5 which basically adds consumer search intensity 
𝜇𝜇 to equation 4. The results of these estimations are reported in columns 3 and 4 
where column 4 additionally contains the number of competitors. Consumer search 
intensity is highly significant and indeed, adding consumer search intensity 𝜇𝜇 
substantially changes the results and particularly eliminates the asymmetric pass-
However, the results do not change if the share of households with low income is included as an 
additional instrument. 
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through rate. The cost pass-through rates are now is 0.83 and 0.86 Euro. Thus, a cost 
increase of 1 Euro is followed by a 1 Euro price increase and a cost decrease of 1 Euro 
causes a price reduction as high as 0.86 Euro. A t-test cannot reject the null 
hypotheses of equal coefficients 𝜏𝜏2  and 𝜌𝜌2  anymore. 
In columns 5 and 6 I replace 𝜇𝜇 with its first difference ∆𝜇𝜇 in order to test for the 
impact of changes in consumer search intensity on price adjustments.18 Again, the 
coefficient is significant and negative suggesting that changes in consumer search 
intensity decrease pass-through, i.e. if consumers increase their search efforts prices are 
increased less when costs rise and are decreased more when costs fall. The more 
consumers are informed the closer we get to the Bertrand equilibrium. The same is 
valid for the number of competitors which also comes up with a statistically significant 
negative sign.  
  
18 I employ the same set of instruments as for 𝜇𝜇. 
21 
 
                                                 
Table 3: Impact of cost changes on price adjustments (incumbents) 
Dependent variable is ∆𝑃𝑃 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
∆𝐶𝐶 × 𝜂𝜂 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.85*** 0.83*** 0.80*** 0.78*** 
 (39.87) (38.89) (35.01) (33.64) (38.46) (37.69) 
       
∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂) 0.50*** 0.41*** 0.97*** 0.86*** 0.77*** 0.64*** 
 (19.23) (14.93) (18.01) (15.71) (20.59) (17.30) 
       
𝜇𝜇   -484.54*** -565.43***   
   (-12.46) (-13.09)   
       
∆𝜇𝜇     -146.66*** -154.39*** 
     (-12.01) (-12.21) 
       
Share of HH with low income 2.54*** 2.55*** 1.51 1.74 2.68** 2.94** 
 (2.75) (2.77) (0.88) (0.90) (2.27) (2.46) 
       
Lagged #Competitors  -0.44***  -1.01***  -0.79*** 
  (-10.18)  (-12.13)  (-13.59) 
       
Zip code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝜌𝜌 (p-val.)   0.00 0.00 0.05 0.59 0.56 0.00 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic - - 31.10 28.91 62.17 59.40 
Critical Stock-Yogo 10% value  - - 3.58 3.58 3.58 3.58 
Wu-Hausman Test (p-val.) - - 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 
# Obs. 21128 21128 21128 21128 21128 21128 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. All models include zip code area and year 
fixed effects. Estimation is by Continuously Updating GMM (CUE). µ and ∆𝜇𝜇, respectively, 
are endogenous. Instruments are the share of HH under the age of 40, the share of new 
households and the share of moved households as well as the interactions of these three 
variables with cost increases (∆𝐶𝐶 ×𝜂𝜂) and decreases �∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 −𝜂𝜂)�.  
 
Counterfactual 
As mentioned before I also observe an interesting counterfactual. The entrants’ 
situation substantially differs from the incumbents’ situation as initially all consumers 
are automatically assigned to the incumbents’ standard tariffs. In other words, 
switching to an entrant requires active searching by a household. For this reason the 
entrants’ consumers are fully informed (at least if they search via a price comparison 
site). Thus, the impact of consumer search intensity on price adjustments should be 
much lower for the entrants.  
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To test this I now estimate models 4 and 5 for the price adjustments of the cheapest 
entrants. The hypothesis in this case is that there should not be an effect on cost pass-
through when controlling for consumer search as all potential consumers of the 
entrants are already fully informed and know the tariffs. Thus, search intensity does 
not substantially change the entrants’ elasticity of demand. This is actually what the 
estimates suggest and the models which control for search intensity and those who do 
not only differ marginally as shown in Table 4. However, somehow surprisingly the 
estimates suggest that there is still an asymmetric cost pass-through but with the 
opposite direction: negative cost shocks are passed-through to a higher degree than 
positive cost shocks which one could call ‘stones and balloons’ or ‘negative asymmetry’ 
as termed by Peltzman (2000). A potential explanation is that entrants generally 
provide a first-year bonus for new consumers which is include in the prices I observe 
for the entrants. It is possible that the entrants try to capture those consumers with 
search costs, i.e. those consumers that only search when prices increase, by giving them 
a high first-year bonus. 
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Table 4: Impact of cost changes on price adjustments (cheapest entrants) 
 
Dependent variable is ∆𝑃𝑃 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
∆𝐶𝐶 × 𝜂𝜂 0.66*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 
 (43.56) (42.53) (38.84) (38.60) (41.74) (41.38) 
       
∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 −𝜂𝜂) 0.87*** 0.79*** 0.83*** 0.78*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 
 (38.58) (33.00) (36.94) (34.84) (43.66) (41.29) 
       
𝜇𝜇   176.11*** 187.01***   
   (7.88) (8.20)   
       
∆𝜇𝜇     74.29*** 75.63*** 
     (8.21) (8.23) 
       
Share of HH with low income 
-2.99*** -2.96*** -2.82*** -2.87*** -3.40*** -3.44*** 
(-3.32) (-3.20) (-2.94) (-2.94) (-3.72) (-3.73) 
       
Lagged #Competitors  -0.43***  -0.17***  -0.18*** 
  (-11.79)  (-3.86)  (-4.25) 
       
Zip code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝜌𝜌 (p-val.)   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic - - 31.86 30.13 63.36 61.71 
Critical Stock-Yogo 10% value  - - 3.58 3.58 3.58 3.58 
Wu-Hausman Test (p-val.) - - 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 
# Obs. 21128 21128 21128 21128 21128 21128 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. All models include zip code area and year 
fixed effects. Estimation is by Continuously Updating GMM (CUE). µ and ∆𝜇𝜇, respectively, 
are endogenous. Instruments are the share of HH under the age of 40, the share of new 
households and the share of moved households as well as the interactions of these three 
variables with cost increases (∆𝐶𝐶 ×𝜂𝜂) and decreases �∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 −𝜂𝜂)�.  
 
Cost Changes, Lerner-Index and Search 
As an alternative specification I now estimate the impact of cost adjustments on the 
Lerner-Index. As I have information on both, cost components and prices the Lerner 
Index can be computed easily and is  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 
Employing the Lerner-Index as dependent variable has the advantage that it accounts 
for the price-cost ratio, i.e. I estimate the impact of positive and negative cost shocks 
on margin squeeze. The results are reported in Table 5 below. Again it can be seen 
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that search intensity drives the results and the coefficient for search intensity is always 
significant and negative suggesting that search intensity reduces market power. Also, 
in models where I do not control for search intensity I find that a 1 Euro cost decrease 
causes a Lerner Index increase of 0.00059 while a 1 Euro cost increase reduces the 
Lerner Index by around 0.00036 (column 2). However, when search intensity is 
included into the impact of a 1 Euro cost decrease on the Lerner-Index is 
approximately two-thirds lower (0.00021) as can be seen from column 4. By contrast, 
including search intensity decreases the impact of cost increases on the Lerner-Index, 
though only slightly, from 0.00036 to 0.00030 (comparison of columns 2 and 4).  
The results again suggest that search intensity is an important driver of market 
outcomes. High search intensity significantly reduces market power as measured by the 
Lerner-Index. 
Table 5: Impact of cost changes on Lerner Index (incumbents) 
Dependent variable is ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
∆𝐶𝐶 × 𝜂𝜂 -0.00034*** -0.00036*** -0.00028*** -0.00030*** -0.00032*** -0.00034*** 
 (-20.54) (-21.30) (-13.39) (-14.39) (-18.08) (-19.29) 
       
∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂) -0.00052*** -0.00059*** -0.00010** -0.00021*** -0.00025*** -0.00036*** 
 (-22.15) (-23.83) (-2.22) (-4.39) (-7.59) (-11.00) 
       
𝜇𝜇   -0.39*** -0.44***   
   (-12.01) (-12.54)   
       
∆𝜇𝜇     -0.12*** -0.13*** 
     (-11.57) (-11.73) 
       
Share of HH with low income 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.002 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.47) (3.51) (1.34) (1.27) (2.84) (2.96) 
       
Lagged #Competitors  -0.0004***  -0.0008***  -0.0007*** 
  (-10.61)  (-12.32)  (-13.65) 
       
Zip code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝜌𝜌 (p-val.)   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.62 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic - - 28.90 26.98 57.92 55.60 
Critical Stock-Yogo 10% val. - - 3.58 3.58 3.58 3.58 
Wu-Hausman Test (p-val.) - - 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.00 
# Obs. 21128 21128 21128 21128 21128 21128 
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Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. All models include zip code area and year 
fixed effects. Estimation is by Continuously Updating GMM (CUE). µ and ∆𝜇𝜇, respectively, 
are endogenous. Instruments are the share of HH under the age of 40, the share of new 
households and the share of moved households as well as the interactions of these three 
variables with cost increases (∆𝐶𝐶 ×𝜂𝜂) and decreases �∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 −𝜂𝜂)�.  
 
As before, I also estimate the same models for the incumbent. Again, the impact of 
search intensity is expected to be substantially lower than for the incumbents and 
again, the estimates confirm this hypothesis as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Impact of cost changes on Lerner Index (cheapest entrants) 
Dependent variable is ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
∆𝐶𝐶 × 𝜂𝜂 -0.00040*** -0.00042*** -0.00045*** -0.00046*** -0.00043*** -0.00044*** 
 (-21.02) (-22.05) (-23.00) (-23.63) (-23.15) (-23.63) 
       
∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 − 𝜂𝜂) -0.00016*** -0.00026*** -0.00022*** -0.00027*** -0.00018*** -0.00022*** 
 (-5.69) (-8.84) (-7.88) (-9.92) (-7.27) (-8.97) 
       
𝜇𝜇   0.20*** 0.21***   
   (7.25) (7.48)   
       
∆𝜇𝜇     0.08*** 0.08*** 
     (7.27) (7.28) 
       
Share of HH with low income -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-1.93) (-1.86) (-1.70) (-1.72) (-2.28) (-2.29) 
       
Lagged #Competitors  -0.0005***  -0.0002***  -0.0002*** 
  (-10.89)  (-3.95)  (-4.47) 
       
Zip code FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝜏𝜏 = 𝜌𝜌 (p-val.)   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic - - 29.62 28.12 59.10 57.79 
Critical Stock-Yogo 10% val. - - 3.58 3.58 3.58 3.58 
Wu-Hausman Test (p-val.) - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# Obs. 21128 21128 21128 21128 21128 21128 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. All models include zip code area and year 
fixed effects. Estimation is by Continuously Updating GMM (CUE). µ and ∆𝜇𝜇, respectively, 
are endogenous. Instruments are the share of HH under the age of 40, the share of new 
households and the share of moved households as well as the interactions of these three 
variables with cost increases (∆𝐶𝐶 ×𝜂𝜂) and decreases �∆𝐶𝐶 × (1 −𝜂𝜂)�.  
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6 Conclusion 
The ‘Rocket and Feathers’ phenomenon – prices rise more strongly (or quickly) when 
costs increase than they fall when costs decrease – is often assigned to collusion but 
observed to the same extent in atomistic markets (Peltzman, 2000). Recent economic 
theory therefore aims to explain asymmetric cost pass-through by different reactions of 
consumers’ search efforts to positive and negative price adjustments. I empirically 
investigate this for the German retail electricity market utilizing a unique panel data 
set on prices, costs and consumer search intensity (i.e. click data from online price 
comparison sites for electricity tariffs) on zip code level. The market provides several 
useful properties for this type of analysis: 1) electricity is a homogenous good, 2) There 
are many local supply areas with different prices and costs in Germany, 3) since the 
liberalization in 1997 a household in a certain zip code has the freedom to choose 
between 155 retailers on average, depending on its location, 4) The former incumbents’ 
consumers are largely uninformed and those of the entrants are informed as all 
households are initially assigned to the incumbent while switching to an entrant 
requires consumer search efforts and 5) a household’s electricity demand is inelastic in 
the short-term. However, even switching to an entrant would generate substantial 
savings the vast majority of consumers is still provided by the former incumbent (78% 
in 2014). Thus, if asymmetric cost pass-through is observed for the incumbents then 
collusion may not be a reasonable explanation but consumer search efforts may be. 
The entrants serve as a control group as their customers are particularly informed.  
The empirical results clearly support theories on a link between search intensity and 
price adjustments. First, the estimates suggest that consumers’ search intensity is a 
function of prices and price changes, respectively. Second, I find evidence for an 
asymmetric cost pass-through if I do not control for consumer search intensity. Third, 
consumer search intensity has a significantly negative impact on price adjustments and 
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the asymmetry in cost pass-through for positive and negative costs shocks essentially 
disappears after controlling for consumer search intensity. For the entrants I do not 
observe ‘Rockets and Feathers’ patterns and adding consumer search intensity does 
not change the results. Thus, the analysis provides empirical evidence for an 
alternative explanation to collusion for asymmetric cost pass-through. The findings 
suggest that the frequently observed ‘Rockets and Feathers’ phenomenon may be 
explained by an omitting variable bias if the impact of consumer search intensity on 
price adjustments is neglected. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 2: Screenshot of a Price Comparison Site (Toptarif.de) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Postal code (Mannheim) & annual 
consumption (3500 kWh) 
Cheapest tariff: € 778.00 per year 
Savings compared to local 
incumbent’s standard tariff:  
€ 298.24 per year 
32 
 
Figure 3: Spatial price distribution (2014) 
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Figure 4: Spatial cost distribution (2014) 
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Figure 5: Spatial search intensity distribution (2014) 
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Figure 6: Distribution of total cost changes per year 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of locally varying cost changes per year 
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